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DCI/IC 73-0544

June 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Substantive Problems in USIB

1. The USIB meeting of 7 June 1973 provided some clear examples of what ails the USIB substantive process. I, therefore, offer this critique.

2. Bureaucratic Obscurantism: There was (and is) a real issue between DOD and CIA/ONE on the matter of detailed projections of military hardware and forces. The real issue is this:

The DOD Position: DIA has been producing detailed military hardware and force projections for several years. These projections are called the DIPP (Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning), which, through agreement between DCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), was to replace the NIPP (National Intelligence Projections for Planning), previously prepared in ONE for (as the name implied) national use. One CIA argument for the transfer of the function to DIA was the unsuitability of such speculative detail for the NIE arena. DIA uses the NIEs as base points for the detailed projections. However, the product is prepared in looseleaf format and is modified as indicated by new evidence. This fact by itself creates differences between DIPP figures and once-a-year NIE projections.

The continued publication of competing detailed projections in the NIEs causes trouble for DOD. DIA's customers get confused when faced with different sets of figures--one produced by DIA in the DIPP and one coordinated by DIA in the NIE. Some users carefully select and combine those projections from both sources which tend to prove their case. When faced with two sets of projections, users ask CIA and DIA to reconcile them. This is really not possible unless one agency simply buys all of the necessary major and minor assumptions underlying the figures of the other agency. Neither will do this because it demoralizes the "workers"--analysts.

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The ONE/CIA View: The real ONE/CIA problem is a basic view that the DCI decision to turn the NIPP over to DIA was a bad one. CIA must continue making such projections to keep DOD honest. The projections are about the only thing left in the major military NIEs that are very estimative. Further, support to these projections in the NIEs justifies much of OSR's across-the-board military analysis effort. The DIPP, with its updating features, actually puts it out ahead of the NIEs substantively; if it is not contested in the NIEs, it will become the driving product.

The Phony Issue: The CIA/ONE posture: There is an important difference between detailed projections prepared for "national" planning and those prepared for "military" planning. The DIA posture: The DIPP is just fine for "national" planning and we won't accept a put-down in an ONE footnote to tables stating the contrary.

Comment: As long as USIB addresses the phony issue instead of the real one, this impasse will remain. To pretend that SecDef and the JCS should use one set of figures for "military" planning and a different one for "national" planning is a nonsense. It makes the USIB process look a little silly.

If the real issue is addressed, there are several options which would solve it. The important objectives for the DCI are:

- Insure that the users get a quality product containing needed detailed military projections;
- Retain the option of preparing CIA projections when requested.

These courses of action would work:

- Reverse the early NIPP-DIPP decision; have ONE draft and coordinate a NIPP, one section at a time as the major military NIEs are produced.
- Have DIA submit its DIPP to ONE for USIB coordination. USIB could note (easier) or approve (harder).
- Have DIA submit its DIPP to all USIB members and include their comments in the publication, including alternative projections if requested. USIB could note the publication and all revisions thereto.

The last solution is the best. It's easiest to sell to DIA. It allows the good feature of updating to continue. It gives the DCI and USIB guarantees against DOD "cooking the books" for institutional reasons. It takes this squabble out of the NIE process.

3. Semantic maneuvers: The other issue that arose was a real substantive difference between General Keegan, joined by Admiral Rectanus, and ONE. Actually, Admiral de Poix favored the thrust of Keegan's argument as well. The ONE "answer" was to propose an additional paragraph which said essentially, "Well, yes, the Soviets might hope 'one day' to do wicked things to Western oil supplies, but you musn't worry about it because the Soviets are more interested in detente, etc. etc."

Had Keegan and Rectanus bought this "fix," another important difference of opinion would have been submerged by semantic maneuver. Of course, the dissent doesn't really make the difference clear. The ONE view is obscured in the text. That Office believes, as argumentation at the USIB brought out, that it is not a Soviet objective to gain control over Western access to Middle East oil. This was much clearer in the earlier ONE drafts. The only reason de Poix could stay with the text was that the ONE position had been watered down in the coordination process--again, by semantics.

SIGNED:

[Redacted] Major General, USA

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Remarks:

This is pertinent to the discussion with Gen.

25X1 Allen and [redacted] at 4:30 today.

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